Ownership, board characteristics and non-hostile take-overs in the UK:
an empirical and predictive analysis
I Introduction
The diffuse nature of the ownership of publicly quoted companies means that shareholders must delegate the management of the business to others. The agency model proposes that there are a number of internal and external governance mechanisms that protect shareholder interests. The key internal mechanism for protecting shareholder interests is the board of directors, Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) . If the various internal mechanisms fail, the market for corporate control acts as a mechanism of last resort, Jensen (1986) .
This perspective is based on Manne (1965) who argued that take-overs disciplined managers who did not maximise shareholder wealth. If incumbent management was opportunistic, the company's share price, and hence its market valuation, would fall. This would result in other management teams bidding to acquire the company and, if this happened, the inefficient incumbent management would be replaced. The market for corporate control therefore acts as a deterrent to discretionary behaviour and encourages wealth maximising activity by the executive (inside) directors.
This aspect of the agency relationship has been empirically tested by attempting to identify observable characteristics, such as board structures or ownership patterns, that differentiate acquired companies from non-acquired companies, Weisbach (1993) . The implication of this is that acquired companies have adopted non-optimal governance structures. This is reflected in their poor financial performance and it is this poor performance that attracts a take-over bid. This logic is usually applied to hostile take-overs because of the inference that these take-overs are disciplinary. The reason for this is that the initial bid was driven by the perception that the targets had been poorly managed and that the new management will remove the existing executive directors, Walsh and Ellwood (1991) and Martin and McConnell (1991) . Thus the market for corporate control overcomes the existing board's entrenchment.
However, in the UK, the vast majority of acquisitions are non-hostile rather than hostile. Hostile take-overs are defined in terms of the initial opposition of the target's board and non-hostile take-overs are those that are not opposed by the target's board. Given the frequency of non-hostile acquisitions, it is of interest to ascertain the extent to which the governance characteristics of friendly targets differ from those of non-targets. If there are differences, the informational content of the governance mechanisms, and its usefulness to shareholders, may be called into question.
The paper examines the relationship between board structures and ownership characteristics of companies that were the subject of non-hostile acquisitions in the UK during the period 1997-1998. A matched sample of non-acquired companies is used as a benchmark against which to assess the extent to which sub-optimal board structures were present in the acquired companies. The predictive ability of the model was then tested against a holdout sample using 1999 acquired and non-acquired companies.
The paper therefore contributes to the governance debate in a number ways.
First, it uses a sample of take-overs that occurred after the introduction of the Code of Best Practice for UK companies. This was developed as a result of the Cadbury Report (Cadbury 1992) which investigated the internal governance mechanisms of UK quoted companies. The analysis covers a period during which the quality of reported data will have improved and the degree of disclosure will have become greater. There have been significant changes in board characteristics since the introduction of the Code and so it is of relevance to examine the extent to which target firms have adopted the recommendations laid down in the Code. Second, non-hostile mergers have become increasingly more frequent in the 1990s in the US (North 2001 ) and the UK, we find over 95% of mergers were friendly in the years studied. The paper analyses the governance characteristics of the targets of friendly acquisitions, an issue that has received relatively little attention. Third, it addresses the question of the performance of friendly targets. Fourth, the differences in performance and governance characteristics raise questions about the traditional practice of classifying acquisitions into hostile and non-hostile because the distinction does not appear to be an accurate means of distinguishing between merger types.
Fifth, it shows the importance of correcting for choice-based sampling bias when using the estimated relationship for prediction purposes. Sixth, it uses a holdout sample to assess the predictive ability of the model.
Our results show that there are significant differences in the governance characteristics of acquired and non-acquired firms. Acquired companies are found to have a higher incidence of duality but also a greater representation of non-executive (outside) directors, particularly those that had served on the board for four years or less. Acquired firms also had larger institutional shareholdings.
There is also evidence that the acquired companies were poorer performers and were younger in terms of years since incorporation, than non-targets. The model was relatively successful in predicting friendly targets using a holdout sample.
This raises questions about the usefulness to shareholders of using past governance characteristics to draw conclusions about the adequacy of current governance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section Two introduces the previous literature on take-overs. Section Three discusses the sample and data used. Section Four evaluates the results and Section Five draws some conclusions.
II Prior Literature
A number of studies have investigated characteristics of acquired firms, including Palepu (1986) and North (2001) . Palepu (1986) found that targets were underperformers, exhibited growth resource imbalance and were smaller than non-targets. North (2001) reported that targets had lower managerial share ownership and higher outsider ownership. However, neither study differentiated between hostile and non-hostile acquisitions and, as Powell (1997) argues, treating take-over targets as a single homogeneous group may lead to model mis-specification because acquisitions appear to occur for different reasons.
For example, whereas hostile acquisitions are believed to be disciplinary, non-hostile take-overs are usually regarded as synergistic, Morck et al (1988) . This suggests that friendly take-overs will generate complementarities that will benefit both companies. What this means in terms of relative performance is, however, not clear. For example, using US data, Morck et al (1988) , Song and Walkling (1993) and Agrawal and Joffe (2001) find no significant differences in the performance of friendly targets and non-target companies. However, contrary to the market for corporate control, Lang et al (1989) , Martin and McConnell (1991) ), Kini et al (1995) and Schwert (2000) all report no difference in the performance of hostile and non-hostile targets.
In the UK, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) and Dahya and Powell (1999) also find insignificant performance differences in the performance of hostile and nonhostile targets. Franks and Mayer (1996) report insignificant pre-bid share price performance differences between hostile and non-hostile targets. However, they also find that hostile targets had significantly lower Q values than non-hostile targets. Nuttal (1999) finds that non-hostile targets have significantly lower Q values than non-acquired firms. Weir (1997) reports that non-hostile targets had a significantly lower return on capital. Nuttall (1999) argues that the high transactions costs incurred by the acquisition process mean that poor pre-bid performance will only attract a bid if it is expected to succeed, particularly if the target is small. This is consistent with the perception that non-hostile acquisitions are synergistic because the purpose is to achieve productivity gains rather than to act as a disciplinary mechanism, even if the target is a poor performer. It is also consistent with results that find insignificant performance differences between targets and non-targets.
The studies mentioned above look at the financial characteristics of target firms.
However, there has been little analysis of the internal governance characteristics of non-hostile targets. In the US, Morck et al (1988) find that non-hostile targets had higher board shareholdings than non-acquired firms. However, Song and Walkling (1993) report no difference in shareholding of non-hostile targets and a non-acquired control group. There has also been little analysis of the characteristics of non-hostile targets in the UK. Two studies, Dahya and Powell (1999) and O'Sullivan and Wong (1998) have employed a univariate approach and one, Weir (1997) , has incorporated a multivariate analysis. In terms of ownership, Dayha and Powell (1999) , who compare hostile and non-hostile targets, find that friendly targets had lower external shareholdings and higher internal shareholdings than hostile targets. In their comparisons of acquired and non-acquired firms, however, Weir (1997) and O'Sullivan and Wong (1998) find no difference in CEO shareholdings or executive director shareholdings.
In terms of board structure, Dayha and Powell (1999) find no difference in the incidence of duality or the percentage of non-executive directors between hostile and non-hostile targets. In contrast, Weir (1997) and O'Sullivan and Wong (1998) found that friendly targets had a greater incidence of duality than non-targets.
Weir (1997) also reported a significant, but weak, inverse relationship between non-executive director representation and the probability of being a non-hostile target. Weir and Laing (2000) , Young (2000) and Dahya et al (forthcoming) . Post-Cadbury, quoted companies have significantly increased the representation of non-executive directors and significantly reduced the frequency of duality.
From the above discussion, let G* and P* respectively be the governance and performance characteristics of acquired firms and G and P be the governance and performance characteristics of non-acquired firms. The market for corporate control implies that: G* ≠ G and P* < P.
Thus targets have suboptimal governance structures and exhibit poor performance. This relationship would describe hostile acquisitions because they disciplinary. However, for non-hostile take-overs, the situation is different because they are non-disciplinary. Let G** and P** be the characteristics of nonhostile targets, then, we can postulate that: G = G** and P = P** Thus, a priori, we would expect no differences in the governance characteristics or performance of friendly targets and non-acquired firms. Given an agency framework, three general hypotheses are proposed: -H 1 : No differences are expected between the board independence of the friendly take-over targets and that of a non-acquired control sample.
No differences are expected between the internal or external shareholdings of friendly take-over targets and those of a non-acquired control sample.
No differences are expected between the performance of friendly targets and that of a non-acquired control sample.
In addition to the issues discussed above, we control for a number of other variables that have been used in other agency studies. These are director quality (North 2001), valuation (Franks and Mayer 1996) and investment expenditure (Shivdasani 1993) . We further control for firm age given that friendly targets are more likely to be younger in terms of stockmarket listing (Nuttall 1999 ).
III Sample, Data and Variables

A. Sample
The sample consists of 308 UK quoted companies of which 154 were acquired under friendly terms during 1997 and 1998 and 154 non-acquired companies that were matched by year, industry (using the Stock Exchange Industrial Classification) and size (as measured by turnover). 1 Matched samples have also has been used by Morck et al (1988) , Song and Walkling (1993) and Agrawal and Joffe (2001) . The take-over targets were selected using the following criteria. First, they had to be non-financial companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange that had their financial statements quoted in sterling. Financial services companies are subject to a regulatory framework which may affect the governance-performance relationship and were therefore omitted. Second, white knight acquisitions were excluded because this is a response to an unwanted bid. Third, they had to have at least 4 years of financial data on Extel Company
Analysis. Fourth, board structure, shareholder and director data had to be available in the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. Fifth, the non-acquired companies had not attracted a take-over bid during 1997 or 1998. Sixth, friendly acquisitions are defined as those that were not initially rejected by the target's management, Morck et al (1988) and Kini et al (1995) .
B. Data Sources
The source of merger and acquisition activity data was various issues of Acquisitions Monthly, a corporate finance publication that provides details of companies involved in merger activity. Financial data were obtained from Extel
Company Analysis. Extel Company Analysis is a CD-ROM that holds financial data on all quoted UK companies and is taken directly from company annual reports. Board structure and shareholder information were obtained from the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. The Register contains data on board structure, the shareholdings of directors and large externally held shareholdings.
It also provides biographical data on directors, which allows an assessment of the extent to which non-executive directors are independent of the executive directors. Firm age data were taken from The Stock Exchange Yearbook.
Variable Definition
ACQUIRED -is the binary dependent variable. It has a value of 1 if the company was acquired and 0 if not.
The independent variables are:
NX -is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. CEOsh -is the percentage shareholding of the chief executive officer or, where present, the executive chairman.
INSTITUTIONsh -is the total percentage shareholdings of institutions that have a shareholding greater than 3%.
ADDNX -is the average number of additional directorships held by the nonexecutive directors.
QRATIO -is defined as market capitalisation divided by total assets. It is a proxy for performance because firms with low Q ratios are viewed less favourably by the market and are therefore regarded as poor performers. Q has been used as a performance indicator in a number of studies, for example, Morck et al (1988) and Lang et al (1993) .
CAPEX -is net capital expenditure divided by total assets, converted to a percentage. (2000) shows that different sources use different definitions of hostility and that this can lead to large variations in the extent to which bids are classified a hostile/nonhostile. One definition quoted indicates that non-hostile acquisitions account for 93% of merger activity. Our figures exclude white knight acquisitions, however, there were only 6 white knight acquisitions in total during 1997/1998. The figures show a steady increase in the incidence of non-hostile acquisitions since 1991 suggesting that the market for corporate control has become a less important governance mechanism, a finding which is mirrored in the US. North (2001) maintains that the increased transactions costs associated with factors such as poisoned pill arrangements, staggered board elections, supermajority decisions and fair price provisions mean that hostile acquisitions are less likely to be undertaken. Many of these factors, however, are either very rare or are unknown in the UK. Holstrom and Kaplan (2001) argue that the decline in hostile takeovers is a consequence of an increased awareness of shareholder value brought about by, for example, voluntary restructuring and the growth of generous stock option plans. This perspective appears to be more relevant for the UK given a greater interest in, and awareness of, governance issues during the 1990s following the publication of the Cadbury Report. In addition to better monitoring by boards, institutional shareholders also appear to have become more active and this may make acceptance of a bid more likely to be accepted than before.
IV. Results
INSERT
The years under study, 1997 and 1998, saw a sharp increase in the percentage of friendly acquisitions which averaged 95.75% over the two years. The figure for the holdout sample, 97.3% in 1999, shows that the trend towards non-hostile take-overs has continued and that hostile take-overs are very rare in the UK.
INSERT TABLE 2   Table 2 reports the univariate analysis of the financial and age characteristics of the acquired and non-acquired firms. The insignificant difference between the sales figures of the two groups shows that the matching process was successful.
There is evidence that the market regarded the acquired as poor performers because they have significantly lower Q ratios than non-acquired firms. However, there is no difference in the accounting performance measure, ROA. Firms that were the subject of a non-hostile acquisition were more likely to be younger than non-acquired firms of the same size. Non-hostile targets included a significantly greater proportion of firms that were five years old or less. The Mann-Whitney test shows that there is no evidence that acquired firms undertook lower capital expenditure than non-acquired firms. There is evidence that target firms are significantly smaller in terms of the market capitalisation which provides further evidence that, for similar turnover figures, the market views targets less favourably.
INSERT These results support other UK studies, Peasnell et al (1998) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) .
Acquired firms do, however, have a significantly higher percentage of nonexecutive directors that have served on the board for four years or less, 18% against 13%. The targets of friendly acquisitions also had a significantly greater incidence of duality than the non-targets, 32% and 22% respectively.
Even though they hold a greater percentage of the shares, there is no significant difference in either CEO shareholdings or those of the executive director shareholdings of the two groups of firms. No difference was found for total externally held shareholdings. However, acquired firms did have a significantly higher percentage of institutional shareholdings than non-acquired firms, 29% to 26% respectively. In relation to non-executive director quality, no difference is found in either the proportion of non-executive directors with additional directorships or the average number of additional directorships held by nonexecutive directors.
The univariate results therefore indicate that target firms were poorer performers, were younger, had relatively more non-executive directors with short tenure and had higher institutional shareholdings than non-targets. The initial results therefore show significant differences in the governance characteristics of firms acquired by friendly means. The poorer performance and the greater frequency of duality are characteristics more commonly associated with hostile acquisitions.
INSERT TABLE 4
The Pearson correlation coefficients for the two samples are given in Table 4 .
The two panels show that the interrelationships between the governance mechanisms differ according to firm status. There are a number of similar significant correlations common to both groups. INSERT TABLE 4 The results of the multivariate analysis are reported in Table 4 . Logistic regression was used because the dependent variable is binary and takes the value if one if a company has been acquired and zero if it has not. The analysis identifies those characteristics that affect the probability that a firm will be the subject of a non-hostile take-over. former is significant at the 10% level and the latter at 1%. The third measure , the percentage of independent non-executive directors, was insignificant. These results suggest that the boards of firms acquired of non-hostile targets are more independent than non-acquired firms. However, there is also evidence that target companies are more likely to have the same person acting as CEO and chairman with duality being positive and significant at 5% in all three models.
Further, all three models show that acquired firms are poorer performers than non-acquired firms, with the QRATIO being significantly lower at the 5% level in each of the models. Table 4 also shows that acquired firms are more likely to have higher institutional shareholdings than non-acquired firms, this being significant at 5%. There is also some, albeit weak, evidence that CEO shareholdings are higher in acquired firms. There is, however, no evidence that the quality of non-executive directors differs between the two groups. In terms of firm age, it appears that friendly targets have been quoted on the London Stock Exchange for a shorter period of time than non-acquired firms. This lends some support to Zingales (1995) who argues that the going public may be an effective way of attracting a higher bid than that which would be achieved if the firm remained private. It would therefore be in the interests of shareholders to accept an initial bid because that would be consistent with the original rationale for going public. The chi square statistic
shows that all models are significant at the 1% level.
The original Cadbury code was aimed at all UK quoted companies. However, it was recognised that smaller companies may find the code too burdensome to adopt. As a result, the City Group for Smaller Companies proposed a slightly amended code to take account of these concerns. The new code was to apply to companies with a market capitalisation below £250 million. The key differences in the small companies code related to the number of non-executive directors, which could be reduced from three to two, and the recognition that separating the posts of CEO and chairman may be inappropriate in smaller companies. The new code was given the support of Sir Adrian Cadbury, the chairman of the Cadbury Committee. However, he did stress that the ultimate objective was to get all companies following the principles laid down in the original Cadbury
Code.
Insert Table 5 The impact of size on the acquired/non-acquired relationship was analysed by removing all firms with a market capitalisation of more than £250 million from the sample, including the company's match. This left a subsample of 125 targets and 125 non-targets. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5 .
Comparing the results with those in Table 4 , there is one important difference, CEO shareholdings is now significant at the 5% level in all three equations suggesting that there are financial incentives to accepting a friendly bid.. Other differences relate to the significance level of variables. For example, nonexecutive director independence which becomes significant and duality less significant, as is the Q ratio. Firm age becomes insignificant. Thus even taking account of size, and the allowances made within the smaller companies code, board and ownership differences persist between acquired and non-acquired firms.
V. Model Developments and Sensitivity Analysis
A number of alternative model specifications were investigated in order to test the robustness of the relationships described in Table 4 . First, it has been proposed that friendly take-over targets will have experienced financial distress, Shrieves and Stevens (1979) and Hotchkiss and Mooridian (1998) . In these circumstances a firm may actively seek a rescue take-over or have no alternative but to accept an offer it receives, Clark and Ofek (1994) . A dummy variable which took the value one if operating profit was negative and zero if it was positive was used to test the impact of financial distress. Only 10% of targets exhibited financial distress and the variable was insignificant in all models suggesting that financial distress did not drive non-hostile acquisitions.
Second, CEO shareholdings was replaced by the shareholdings of the other executive directors to take account of the possibility that other executive directors owned significant shareholdings in the company. This variable was insignificant in all models. Third, the impact of total executive director shareholdings was assessed and was found to be insignificant in all three equations. Fourth, non-institutional external shareholdings in excess of 3% were used to replace institutional shareholdings. This includes individuals, firms and other organisations that own a large shareholding. This measure of external shareholding was found to be insignificant.
Fifth, alternative performance measures were also used to assess how far there was consistency across types of performance measure. A second market valuation measure, enterprise value deflated by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 3 , Opler and Titman (1993) , gave similar results to those obtained by using the Q ratio. Therefore, market based performance measures provide consistent evidence that the targets of friendly acquisitions show signs of underperformance. In contrast, the results using an accounting measure, the return on assets, were insignificant for models 1 and 2 but significant at the 10% level, and positive, for model 3.
Sixth, a new dummy variable was constructed for firm age. This one took account of firms being older than 10 years rather than the 5 years used initially. This was found to be insignificant in all models. Thus, although the initial results provide some weak evidence that friendly acquisitions are more likely to occur in younger firms. The results relating to firm age therefore suggest that, if Zingales (1995) is correct, the time horizon for newly floated companies to receive a friendly bid is relatively short.
Seventh, alternative measures of director quality were incorporated into the multivariate analysis. Non-executive director quality was measured by the proportion of non-executive directors with additional directorships, Dowen (1995). This was also found to be insignificant. The calibre of the executive directors was also investigated by means of the average additional directorships they held and by the proportion that has additional directorships, Shivdasani (1993) . In all cases the quality measures were found to be insignificant. Thus there is no evidence that the quality of directors of friendly targets is worse that that of the non-acquired control group.
Eighth, a size variable was included, the log of market capitalisation, Schwert (2000) . The qualitative nature of the results was unchanged. The only differences related to the Q ratio which remained significant but only at 10%, and CEO shareholdings which became insignificant.
The sensitivity analyses show that the regression results are robust. They show that, as well as market-based performance differences, there are also a number of governance differences between friendly targets and a matched non-acquired control group. These differences also hold amongst small friendly targets.
VI. Model prediction
The analysis discussed above is based on matched samples. However, this approach means that the sampling is not random and that this has implications when using the model for predicting the probability of acquisition. Let T 1 be the total population of firms acquired through friendly acquisition and T 2 be the total population of non-acquired firms. Also let n 1 be the sample of acquired firms and n 2 the sample of non-acquired firms. Empirically, n 1 /T 1 = 1 because all acquisitions are included if they meet the selection criteria, but n 2 /T 2 ≠ 1 because the n 2 is much less than T 2 . Given that matched samples require n 1 =n 2 , the sampling process overestimates the relative frequency of target firms because targets actually occur much less often than non-targets. As a result, maximum likelihood estimation will result in inconsistent and asymptotically unbiased estimates.
However, in logistic regression, the bias occurs only in the constant but not the coefficients of the independent variable, Maddala (1991) . The nature of the bias in the constant takes the form ln(P 1 -ln(P 2 ) where P 1 is the proportion of acquisitions in the population of acquired firms (n 1 /T 1 ) and P 2 is the proportion of non target firms in the non acquired population (n 2 /T 2 ). The constant must be reduced by the value of the bias. In this analysis, n 1 =T 1 by definition because all acquisitions that met the specified criteria are included. The constant must be reduced by 3.07 to overcome the bias. 4 This would generate a constant of -4.2599 for model 1, -3.9998 for model 2 and -3.9088 for model 3, Table 3 .
For example, using the mean values of the independent variables, and if no account is taken of the bias in the matched samples, the median probability of acquisition is 0.546 for targets and 0.444 for non-targets. Correcting for the bias, however, yields acquisition probabilities of 0.058 for targets and 0.042 for nontargets. The unadjusted figures therefore imply that firms face a high probability of being acquired whereas in practice this is not the case. Further as Table 4 shows, the model is highly significant even though the actual probability of acquisition is quite small. It is important therefore, to treat the regression result with some caution because of the low probability of acquisition that firms actually face. Therefore, studies that use matched samples for predictive purposes will result in overestimating the probability of acquisition if no adjustment is made to correct the sampling bias.
If a model is to be used for prediction purposes, rather than for identifying variables that influence the probability of acquisition, it is necessary to test the model against a holdout sample. It is not sufficient to use the model to test the existing samples because they have been used in the determination of the relationship and this will result in the model generating an erroneously high correct prediction. For example, if model 3 is used, the model correctly classifies 64% of targets and 64% of non-targets. Palepu (1986) proposes a method for estimating the optimal cut-off point based on the estimated acquisition probability of each firm in the sample, using the corrected constant term.
INSERT TABLE 6
The individual firm probability of acquisition was calculated using the estimated coefficients of model 3, Table 4 and the mean values of the independent variables. The estimated regression equation is then used to calculate the probability of acquisition. 5 Table 6 shows the acquisition probability distribution of acquired and non-acquired firms with the percentage of each category falling within each probability range. The mid point of each range was used to construct Figure 1 . To the left of the point of intersection, that where the estimated probability of acquisition is less than the cut-off, firms are classified as non targets; to the right, firms are classified as targets. Figure 1 shows that the optimal cut-off point is 0.048. If this is applied to the current model, we find that 67% of targets and 57% of non-targets are correctly identified using the mean values of the variables. However, as indicated above, these figures are based on the initial sample and so any predictions are likely to be biased because the current sample has been used to generate the coefficients.
To counteract this bias, a holdout sample was constructed using 1999 data which consisted of 28 acquired and 28 matched non-acquired firms. The individual firm probability of acquisition was then calculated using the coefficients from Model 3, Table 4 . In addition, the optimal cut-off point of 0.048 taken from Figure 1 was used to differentiate between acquired and non acquired firms. As before, if a firm's estimated probability of acquisition was less than 0.048, it was classified as a non-target and if the probability of acquisition was greater than 0.048 it was classified as a target. The results show that the model correctly classifies 54% of non-acquired firms. However, it is more successful at predicting acquired firms with 57% of acquired firms being correctly classified.
VII Conclusions
The analysis has looked at the governance characteristics of firms that were the target of non-hostile acquisitions in the UK. The agency model regards the market for corporate control as a mechanism of last resort and the purpose of the paper was to assess how far non-hostile acquisitions could also be explained within the model.
Friendly targets were shown to perform more poorly than a control sample. The results further show that friendly targets are more likely to have more independent board compositions, in terms of a number of non-executive director representation measures. They are also more likely to have the same person acting as CEO and chairman. Institutions were found to be more likely to have larger shareholdings in the targets. One reason for the higher proportion of nonexecutive directors with relatively short tenure in the acquired firms may be the result of an increase in board independence after a performance decline, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) . Alternatively, non-executive directors may leave target company boards if they are dissatisfied with its strategy or performance and be replaced with new directors, Brown and Maloney (1998) .
The combination of a more independent board and greater shareholdings by the institutions appear to act as effective substitutes for duality. Therefore, given the relatively poor performance, the board composition and ownership structure make it more difficult for the board to reject an initial bid. The board will be better placed to recommend acceptance of any bid that is deemed to be in the shareholders' interests.
Thus, given the acquired firms' poor performance and their different governance characteristics, the agency model may still be applied to friendly acquisitions in that it appears to act as a mechanism of last resort but with the blessing of the board rather than its opposition. The market for corporate control and internal board characteristics therefore appear to be substitute mechanisms for nonhostile acquisitions as well as for hostile take-overs. These results are consistent with Kini et al (1995) and Dahya and Powell (1999) who found the distinction between hostile and non-hostile did not indicate the extent to which CEOs would be replaced post-acquisition. It may be, therefore, that distinguishing between hostile and non-hostile acquisitions is not the most useful way of analysing merger behaviour because the implicit assumption is that hostile acquisitions are disciplinary and non-hostile acquisitions are not. Much UK and US work has been undertaken using this distinction. However, these results show that performance and governance differences occur even though an acquisition is friendly.
The agency model offers insights into the merger process and this study contributes to the debate by showing that governance characteristics are significant determinants of friendly acquisitions. The results raise questions about the usefulness of the hostile/non-hostile distinction when analysing the premerger situation. This supports Franks and Mayer (1996) and Schwert (2000) .
The extent to which the market for corporate control acts as a mechanism of last resort may more accurately assessed by the analysis of post-merger events. The results therefore raise issues about the informational content of governance structures. The study shows that we can generate statistically significant backward-looking relationships which provide a degree of success in predicting future take-over targets. Thus, although they provide shareholders with some information, it is not clear how far shareholders are able to determine whether a particular governance mechanism, or combination of mechanisms, is good or bad.
The study has a number of limitations that point the way for future research. First, although there has been shown to be governance differences between acquired and non-acquired firms, we require to have a greater understanding of the process by which an initial bid is accepted. 5. The logistic model gives the probability of acquisition as P=1/(1+exp(
where Z is the logistic regression equation (in this case model 3, table 4). .00 234.14 -0.428 -2.333** ***-significant at the 1% level: ** -significant at the 5% level: * -significant at the 10% level.
The Q ratio is market capitalisation deflated by total assets. ROA is earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets, converted into a percentage. Firm age is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a company had been quoted on the London Stock Exchange for less than five years and 0 if it is longer. CAPEX is net capital expenditure deflated by total assets converted into a percentage. ***-significant at the 1% level: ** -significant at the 5% level: * -significant at the 10% level.
Board size is the total number of directors on the board. NXd is the total number of executive directors and NNX is the toal number of non-executive directors on the board. NX is the percentage of non-executive direcors and IND is the percentage of independent directors. Tenure is measured by the percentage of non-executive directos with less than four years service on the board. Duality occurs when the same person acts as CEO and chair. CEOsh is the ordinary shareholding of the CEO and XDsh represents the ordinary shareholdings of the other executive directors. EXTsh measures the total external shareholdings that are in excess of 3% and INSTITsh is the total institutional shareholdings in excess of 3%. NXADD is the average number of additional directorships held by non-executive directors and PNXADD gives the proprtion of non-executive directors that have additional directorships. NX is the percentage of non-executive direcors and IND is the percentage of independent directors. TENURE is measured by the percentage of non-executive directos with less than four years service on the board. Duality occurs when the same person acts as CEO and chair. FIRM AGE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a company had been quoted on the London Stock Exchange for less than five years and 0 if it is longer. CEOsh is the ordinary shareholding of the CEO and XDsh represents the ordinary shareholdings of the other executive directors.
INSTITsh is the total institutional shareholdings in excess of 3%. NXADD is the average number of additional directorships held by non-executive directors. CAPEX is the percentage net capital expenditure deflated by total assets. Model Chi Square 20.60*** 21.04*** 24.25*** ***-significant at the 1% level: ** -significant at the 5% level: * -significant at the 10% level. Wald statistics in parentheses.
NX is the percentage of non-executive direcors and IND is the percentage of independent directors. TENURE is measured by the percentage of non-executive directos with less than four years service on the board. Duality occurs when the same person acts as CEO and chair. FIRM AGE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a company had been quoted on the London Stock Exchange for less than five years and 0 if it is longer. CEOsh is the ordinary shareholding of the CEO and XDsh represents the ordinary shareholdings of the other executive directors. EXTsh measures the total external shareholdings that are in excess of 3% and INSTITsh is the total institutional shareholdings in excess of 3%. NXADD is the average number of additional directorships held by non-executive directors. CAPEX is the percentage net capital expenditure deflated by total assets. The estimated probability of acquisition is derived using model 3 from table 5. The estimated model, Z, is used to calculate the estimated probability of acquisition P = 1/(1+exp (-Z) ). Columns 2 and 3 show the perecntage of acquired and non-acquired firms respectively that fall within each of the estmated probabability of acquisition bands given in column 1. 
